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TERMINATING EMPLOYEES IN VIRGINIA: A ROADMAP
FOR THE EMPLOYER, THE EMPLOYEE, AND THEIR
COUNSEL
Keith D. Boyette*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Virginia, as elsewhere, employees are increasingly challenging
the employer's decision to terminate the employment relationship.
Consequently, the employer's time and resources are diverted from
the operation of business to the defense of employee lawsuits. The
probability and'risk of such litigation can be minimized if the em-
ployer, advised by his counsel, structures his employment con-
tracts and relationships with an awareness of the legal conse-
quences of his actions.
This article addresses what may be characterized as the current
common law of Virginia on the termination of employees. This ar-
ticle will not address federal statutory limitations on the em-
ployer's ability to terminate,1 although obviously, these limitations
must be reviewed and considered whenever an employee is
discharged.
The relationship between an employer and employee is contrac-
tual in nature.2 While the relationship is sometimes embodied in a
written contract, the contract is more often oral. The parties to the
relationship may not even have discussed the terms of the employ-
ment; however, an implied employment contract exists wherever
one person performs labor or services of value for another under
circumstances which indicate "that the parties intended and un-
* Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. 1975,
George Washington University;, J.D. 1978, Washington & Lee University.
1. Federal statutes prohibit termination of an employee when the termination occurs be-
cause of the employee's race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); sex, id.; age, 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); physical handicap, id. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981);
or union activity, id. § 151 (1976). In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976)), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (Supp. V 1981)), and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1976)) prohibit the dismissal
of an employee because he reports employer activity which violates the statute in question.
2. In Humphrees v. Boxley Bros., 146 Va. 91, 97, 135 S.E. 890, 891 (1926), the Supreme
Court of Virginia observed that "[tihe relation of employer and employee can only exist by
virtue of contract, express or implied .... "
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derstood that the person performing the services was to be paid for
them."3
The ability of the parties to terminate the contract depends on
the express or implied terms of the contract. Where the contract
addresses the right of the parties to terminate the relationship, the
terminating party must adhere to those requirements or expose
himself to liability for breach. For example, where the contract re-
quires a specified period of written notice in advance of termina-
tion, failure to comply with the terms of the notice requirement
will result in liability for damages incurred by the other party dur-
ing the notice period. Thus, where the employee is dismissed with-
out the required notice, he is entitled to recover compensation for
that notice period.4
3. Charlottesville Music Center, Inc. v. McCray, 215 Va. 31, 35, 205 S.E.2d 674, 678
(1974).
4. Raynor v. Burroughs Corp., 294 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D. Va. 1968) (applying Michigan
law; majority rule). Professor Corbin, however, disagrees with this analysis, asserting:
If a party who has a power of termination by notice fails to give the notice in the
form and at the time required by his reservation, it is ineffective as a termination. Its
terms and the circumstances under which it is given may be such as to justify the
other party in regarding it as a repudiation of the contract, with all the effects of
repudiation.
6 A. CORBIN, CORmN ON CoNTRACTs § 1266 (1962) (footnote omitted). See also Stockmen's
Supply Co. v. Jenne, 72 Idaho 57, 237 P.2d 613 (1951) (failure to give the specified notice
left both parties bound by the contract).
Generally, courts considering this issue have agreed with the Raynor holding (294 F.
Supp. 238) that termination upon inadequate notice or upon failure to give notice termi-
nates the contractual relationship at the end of the specified notice period and entitles the
employee to recover compensation for the notice period only and not for the entire balance
of the contract period. E.g., Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Andrews, 6
Ariz. 205, 56 P. 969 (1899); Johnson v. Pacific Bank & Store Fixture Co., 59 Wash. 58, 109 P.
205 (1910); see also Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 272, 274-79 (1964).
The Supreme Court of Virginia has aligned itself to some extent with the general rule
holding that a notice which did not accord with the contract termination provision was suffi-
cient to terminate the contract upon the expiration of the period specified in the contract.
Hepner v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 220 Va. 422, 428, 258 S.E.2d 508, 512 (1979). The
Virginia court would probably hold also that the damages for failure to comply with a con-
tractual notice of termination provision are limited to those incurred during the contractual
notice period.
However, the courts have recognized two exceptions to this general rule. Where the em-
ployee will forfeit vested rights beyond normal compensation if the contract is permitted to
be terminated, the inadequate or nonexistent notice is ignored, and the contract continues
in force. E.g., Hubert v. Luder's, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 427, 88 S.E.2d 481 (1955); Oldfield v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 198 Iowa 20, 199 N.W. 161 (1924). Furthermore, where the contractual
provision requires notice before termination and permits the noticed party to obviate the
termination by taking specified action, the inadequate or nonexistent notice is likewise ig-
nored, and the contract continues. E.g., Carleno Coal Sales, Inc. v. Ramsay Coal Co., 129
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II. TERMINATION FOR CAUSE
If the employment contract is for a specified term, a party desir-
ing to terminate the contract before its expiration must have
cause.5 Additionally, the contract itself may expressly require
cause before termination can occur.' Where cause is required, ter-
mination of the relationship without cause can result in the impo-
sition of damages for breach of the contract.7 The damages recov-
erable under such circumstances include the amount due under the
contract for the remainder of the contract term less any amounts
the employee earned or might have earned by reasonable effort in
other employment.8 Furthermore, if cause is required and the em-
ployer discharges the employee without cause, the Virginia courts
will not enforce contract covenants proscribing activity after the
end of the employment relationship, such as those prohibiting
competition with the employer, solicitation of the employer's cus-
tomers, or disclosure of information concerning the employer's
customers. 9
Where the employer decides to discharge an employee under cir-
cumstances requiring cause, the employer should carefully review
his reasons for termination. The grounds for dismissing the em-
ployee should be as specific as possible. In the majority of suits,
the determination of whether the employer had cause to discharge
will be a question of fact to be submitted to the jury.10
An all-inclusive listing of the circumstances which might consti-
tute cause for termination is impossible. If the employer's action is
questioned in litigation, the ultimate outcome will obviously turn
upon the facts and circumstances of the employment contract, the
performance of that contract, and the events leading up to its ter-
mination. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has discussed
what constitutes sufficient cause for termination in several cases
where cause for discharge was held to be required.
Colo. 393, 270 P.2d 755 (1954).
5. E.g., Twohy v. Harris, 194 Va. 69, 80, 72 S.E.2d 329, 335-36 (1952); Standard Laundry
Serv., Inc. v. Pastelnick, 166 Va. 125, 130, 184 S.E. 193, 195 (1936).
6. E.g., Norfolk S. Ry. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d 110 (1950).
7. Standard Laundry Serv., Inc. v. Pastelnick, 166 Va. at 129, 184 S.E. at 195.
8. Id.; Virginia Talc & Soapstone Co. v. Hurkamp, 124 Va. 721, 728-29, 98 S.E. 681, 683
(1919). The employer has the burden of proving the employee's failure to mitigate damages
by securing other employment. Paddock v. Mason, 187 Va. 809, 818, 48 S.E.2d 199, 203
(1948).
9. Standard Laundry Serv., Inc. v. Pastelnick, 166 Va. at 130, 184 S.E. at 195.
10. Citizen Home Ins. Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 589, 61 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1950).
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First, if an employee violates the terms of his employment con-
tract or the employer's reasonable policies, rules, or regulations,
the employer may have adequate cause to terminate.
In Spotswood Arms Corp. v. Este,11 the employee had served as
manager of the employer's hotel. Although both the employer and
the employee had prepared written contracts, neither contract had
been executed.12 Nevertheless, the court found that the employ-
ment was for a specific term and that cause was required for the
employer to discharge the employee without liability.13 In Este, the
employer became dissatisfied upon learning, shortly after the em-
ployment began, that the employee was violating orders concerning
how he should conduct the financial affairs of the corporation.1 4
The employer brought the violations to the employee's attention to
no avail.1 5 Both the employer's orders and the employee's failure to
comply were documented.1 6 The employee was dismissed after re-
fusing to follow his employer's order to discharge a subordinate
employee. 17
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the employer had ade-
quate cause to terminate his manager in Este.' The court found
that all employment contracts contain an implied covenant that
the employee will comply with the "lawful and reasonable" orders
of the employer relating to employment performance. 9 Where the
employee disobeys the express provisions of the employment con-
tract or the general rules, instructions, or particular commands of
the employer, the court noted that such disobedience justified per-
emptory dismissal.20
Thus, where cause is required, the fact that the employee has
violated the express terms of the contract or a "lawful and reason-
able" company policy or order may constitute cause for discharging
the employee, enabling the employer to avoid liability. Whether
disobedience of a particular company policy or order is deemed
11. 147 Va. 1047, 133 S.E. 570 (1926).
12. Id. at 1049, 133 S.E. at 571.
13. Id. at 1049, 1055, 133 S.E. at 571, 573.
14. Id. at 1050, 133 S.E. at 571-72.
15. Id. at 1050-53, 133 S.E. at 571-73.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1053-55, 133 S.E. at 572-74.
18. Id. at 1061-64, 133 S.E. at 574-76.
19. Id. at 1061, 133 S.E. at 574 (quoting 1 C. LABATT, MASTER & SERVANT § 273 (2d ed.
1913)).
20. 147 Va. at 1061, 1064, 133 S.E. at 574, 575.
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sufficient to justify termination will probably depend on the rela-
tive importance of the policy or order to the successful operation of
the employer's business.21 Disobedience of minor rules or orders,
standing alone, will probably be insufficient to justify termination
if cause is required. Additionally, the likelihood that disobedience
of an employer's policies, rules, or orders will constitute cause is
enhanced where the employer can show repeated violations by the
employee.2 2 Nevertheless, the courts are likely to defer to the em-
ployer's judgment on what is reasonable and necessary for the op-
eration of his business and are unlikely to second-guess the wisdom
of a particular policy, rule, or order.
If the reason for the discharge is failure to follow company policy
or a specific order, the fact that the policy exists and was commu-
nicated to the employee or that the order was actually given to the
employee should be established and documented. Evidence of the
employee's failure to follow the policy or his disobedience of an
order should likewise be documented. Evidence that the policy was
a reasonable one applied uniformly and that the employee was dis-
missed only after a careful investigation and review of his actions
will enhance the likelihood that the discharge will be found to have
been justified if it is later questioned.
Disability or incapacity may be cause for termination. In Citizen
Home Insurance Co. v. Glisson,23 the employee was hired as a
salesman under a written employment contract which provided
that termination could result if either party violated its terms, cov-
enants, or conditions.2 4 After fulfilling his duties under the con-
tract for a number of years, the employee became disabled and was
unable to perform his duties. When the disability had continued
for a year, the employer discharged him.25
The Virginia Supreme Court in Glisson held that the employer
had adequate cause to terminate the employee.26 The court stated
that, where the parties have not allocated the risk of incapacity in
the contract, "temporary disability of short duration as compared
with the term of service contemplated" will not constitute suffi-
21. Id. at 1062, 133 S.E. at 575.
22. Id.
23. 191 Va. 582, 61 S.E.2d 859 (1950).
24. Id. at 585, 61 S.E.2d at 860.
25. Id. at 585-86, 61 S.E.2d at 860-61.
26. Id. at 590, 61 S.E.2d at 863.
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cient cause for discharging the employee. However, the court
ruled that, where the employer has not assumed the risk of inca-
pacity, a long illness which renders the employee "unable to sub-
stantially perform his duties permits the employer to treat the
agreement as terminated."2
While Glisson does not provide a fixed formula for determining
whether a disability constitutes sufficient cause for termination,
the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the following factors are
relevant to the determination:
[t]he nature of the business and duties required by the contract, the
character and possible duration of the illness, the necessities of the
employer, the effect upon... [the employer's] interest of the cessa-
tion for a time of the employee's services, [and] whether the duties
may be reasonably and substantially performed for a time by an-
other . 29
A central issue in disability cases, when the employer has not as-
sumed the risk of disability, is whether there has been a failure of
the consideration which supported the contract."
A third line of cases in Virginia addresses the question of
whether unsatisfactory performance by the employee can consti-
tute cause for termination. In Crescent Horseshoe & Iron Co. v.
Eynon, 31 the employer discharged the employee for unsatisfactory
performance. The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that unless
the employee professes to have a greater than ordinary degree of
skill and has contracted to perform his services at that higher level,
the employer is entitled to have his employde perform only in a
reasonably skillful manner.3 2 Thus, where cause for termination is
required, the employer may terminate an employee only for failing
to perform in this reasonably skillful manner unless a contractual
provision requires a higher degree of skill.3"
The trier of fact determines whether the employee failed to
render the contracted level of services.34 In Forsberg v. Zehm, 5 the
27. Id. at 587, 61 S.E.2d at 861.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 589, 61 S.E.2d at 862.
30. Id. at 590, 61 S.E.2d at 862.
31. 95 Va. 151, 27 S.E. 935 (1897).
32. Id. at 159, 27 S.E. at 937.
33. Id.
34. Forsberg v. Zehm, 150 Va. 756, 770, 143 S.E. 284, 288 (1928).
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employee contracted to perform his duties to the best of his ability
and to promote a high degree of excellence and efficiency in the
product produced.36 The Virginia Supreme Court observed that
the determination of whether the employee had rendered the con-
tracted level of services must take into account the nature of the
employment and the reasonableness of the employer's expecta-
tions.37 At a minimum, the jury may properly consider the relation
of the contracting parties to each other, the real object of the con-
tract, and the character of the services to be rendered. 8
In a termination case based on the employee's unsatisfactory
performance, the employer's likelihood of prevailing in a court
challenge is increased where he has established objective criteria
for judging the employee's performance. The criteria should relate
to the nature and object of the employment and should be uni-
formly applied. Furthermore, the employee should have been in-
formed of his unsatisfactory performance and have been given an
opportunity to correct his performance prior to dismissal.
A fourth line of cases deals with the issue of whether criminal
conduct by an employee in the course of his employment consti-
tutes cause for dismissal. In Rudlin v. Parker,39 the employee was
dismissed for making indecent advances to a female customer. 0
The Virginia court noted that such conduct, if proven, constituted
commission of a crime41 and that the commission of a crime by an
employee in the course of his employment would constitute cause
for termination.42
Where the employment contract is for a specified duration or
expressly requires cause for termination, the employer has the bur-
den of proving cause justifying the dismissal.43 Where the cause
assigned by the employer is the violation of the express terms of
the contract or a company policy or order, the disability of the em-
ployee, or his unsatisfactory performance, the employer must es-
tablish that cause by a preponderance of the evidence.44 However,
35. 150 Va. 756, 143 S.E. 284.
36. Id. at 761, 143 S.E. at 285.
37. Id. at 770-71, 143 S.E. at 288.
38. Id. at 772, 143 S.E. at 289.
39. 186 Va. 647, 43 S.E.2d 918 (1947).
40. Id. at 651, 43 S.E.2d at 920.
41. Id. at 653, 43 S.E.2d at 920.
42. Id. at 654, 43 S.E.2d at 921.
43. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 977-78, 59 S.E.2d 110, 115 (1950).
44. Id. at 977-78, 59 S.E.2d at 115.
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where the employee is discharged for conduct of a "character as to
import a crime," the burden of proof is "clear and satisfactory"
evidence.45
If the employee challenges his dismissal under circumstances re-
quiring cause, the sole issue in the ensuing litigation is whether a
legal cause existed for the discharge. The employer's underlying
motive for terminating the employee is irrelevant and immaterial
and therefore not admissible.4e Additionally, evidence that the em-
ployer continued the employment after learning of the conduct
which ultimately resulted in the employee's dismissal does not pre-
clude the employer from later terminating the employee because of
that conduct.47 As the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated, "The
master may overlook breaches of duty in the servant, hoping for a
reformation; but, if he is disappointed and the servant continues
his course of unfaithfulness, he may act, in view of his whole
course of conduct, in determining whether the contract of employ-
ment should be terminated. '48 Nevertheless, evidence that the em-
ployer knowingly overlooked the employee's conduct or similar
conduct by other employees may discredit the alleged existence of
policies prohibiting the conduct and the importance of those poli-
cies to the successful operation of the employer's business.
Finally, where the discharge of an employee occurs under cir-
cumstances requiring cause and the employee challenges the dis-
charge, the employer may rely either upon grounds for the dismis-
sal different from those stated at the time of the termination or
upon grounds discovered after the dismissal.49 The cause relied
upon by the employer in any litigation over the discharge need not
have been the inducing motive for the dismissal nor even known to
the employer at the time of termination.5"
45. Rudlin v. Parker, 186 Va. at 653, 43 S.E.2d at 921. This higher burden of proof is also
required where the employee is charged with fraud. Id. The greater burden is imposed be-
cause "one charged with wrong doing or other unlawful act is presumed innocent of the
charge." Id.
46. Crescent Horseshoe & Iron Co. v. Eynon, 95 Va. 151, 159, 27 S.E. 935, 937 (1897).
47. Spotswood Arms Corp. v. Este, 147 Va. 1047, 1064, 133 S.E. 570, 575 (1926).
48. Id. (quoting Gray v. Shepard, 147 N.Y. 177, -, 41 N.E. 500, 502 (1895)).
49. Crescent Horseshoe & Iron Co. v. Eynon, 95 Va. at 158, 27 S.E. at 936.
50. Id.
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III. AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
Where a written employment contract is ambiguous regarding its
duration or the need for cause to terminate or the contract is oral
and both of the parties do not concede that the employment rela-
tionship is for a specified duration or terminable only for cause,
the ability to terminate the employment relationship and the con-
sequences of the termination are more uncertain.
In Virginia, where the employment contract, whether written or
oral, does not specify that it will last for a specified period of time,
the courts recognize a rebuttable presumption that the employ-
ment is at will and therefore terminable at any time by either
party for any reason or even for no reason.5' The courts also recog-
nize a rebuttable presumption of at-will employment in situations
where the contract does not specify either that the employment
relationship will last as long as the employee performs satisfacto-
rily or that the contract is terminable only for cause. 52 Of course, if
the written contract expressly provides that it is terminable at any
time by either party for any reason or even for no reason, or if both
parties concede as much, the contract itself creates an employment
at will, and no presumption is necessary.
Where the contract is terminable at will, the dismissed employee
has "no basis for recovery of damages against his erstwhile em-
ployer."53 The Supreme Court of Virginia has quite properly char-
acterized an at-will contract as a contract of hazard."
Because in most employment relationships the parties have con-
tracted orally and either did not discuss, or have differing recollec-
tions of, the duration of the relationship or the circumstances
under which the relationship will terminate, the rebuttable pre-
sumption of at-will employment is frequently employed in litiga-
tion challenging the employee's dismissal. However, use of the pre-
sumption does not necessarily end the case.
The employee can successfully rebut the presumption of a termi-
51. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 349, 297 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1982); Norfolk
S. Ry. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 976, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1950); Edwards Co. v. Deihl, 160 Va.
587, 590, 169 S.E. 907, 908 (1933); Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 718, 164 S.E. 387,
389 (1932); Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932).
52. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. at 348-49, 297 S.E.2d at 650; Norfolk S. Ry. v.
Harris, 190 Va. at 976, 59 S.E.2d at 114.
53. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. at 349, 297 S.E.2d at 650.
54. Edwards Co. v. Deihl, 160 Va. at 590, 169 S.E. at 908.
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nable-at-will contract by proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that his contract was terminable only for cause." In deter-
mining whether the presumption that the contract was at will has
been rebutted, the Virginia courts consider the understanding and
intent of the parties, as ascertained from their written and oral
negotiations, the practices in the business, the situations of the
parties, and the nature of the employment.56
For example, in Title Insurance Co. v. Howell,57 a suit challeng-
ing a discharge after two-and-a-half months of employment, the
employee failed to rebut the presumption of an at-will relation-
ship. The employee, a lawyer, was hired pursuant to a resolution of
the executive committee of the company's board of directors stat-
ing that he was employed "at the rate of $708.34 per month, paya-
ble on the 1st and 15th of each month. ' 58 The employee and a
representative of the employer initialed a copy of the resolution.59
The negotiations preceding the initialing had included the em-
ployee's request for an annual salary and the employer's response
that officers of the company were employed by the month with the
right to a month's notice of termination. 0
In holding that the contract was at will rather than from month
to month, the Virginia Supreme Court placed primary emphasis on
the language of the resolution. 1 The court ignored the negotiations
between the parties and stressed that the resolution itself stated
merely the rate of compensation.6 2 The court found that the reso-
lution constituted the entire contract and thus could not be altered
by parol evidence and that, because the employer's representative
had maintained throughout negotiations that he had no authority
to make the contract, his representations did not become part of
the contract. 3
In Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze,4 the employee sued his
employer, maintaining that he had a one-year oral contract which
55. Id.
56. Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. at 595, 164 S.E. at 398-99.
57. 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387 (1932).
58. Id. at 716, 164 S.E. at 388.
59. Id. at 717, 164 S.E. at 388.
60. Id. at 716-17, 164 S.E. at 388.
61. Id. at 717, 164 S.E. at 389-90.
62. Id. at 717, 164 S.E. at 389.
63. Id. at 718-19, 164 S.E. at 389-90.
64. 158 Va. 586, 164 S.E. 397 (1932).
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was later renewed from year to year. 5 The court initially applied
the presumption of an at-will relationship.6 While the plaintiff
maintained that his employer had said that he would be paid
$2,400 a year, the employer claimed to have told the employee that
he would be paid $200 a month.67 The employer presented evi-
dence that all of its employees were employed by the month and
that monthly employment was the custom in the trade.68 Further-
more, when the employer terminated the employee, it offered him
more than a month's salary as severance pay.69 In light of the con-
flicting testimony, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the case
had properly been submitted to the jury and upheld the verdict
that this was not an at-will contract. In so holding, the court em-
phasized the fact that the employer offered more than a month's
salary as severance pay, an act inconsistent with the rights of the
parties under an at-will employment contract.70
On the other hand, in Edwards Co. v. Deihl,71 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the presumption that the employment
contract is terminable at will was not rebutted. In reaching this
conclusion, the c9urt considered the nature of the business, the un-
certainty that the business would continue, and the fact that this
uncertainty was discussed by the parties at the time the employ-
ment relationship was created. 2
The presumption that employment of an unspecified duration is
terminable at will has been the rule in most American jurisdictions
at least since 1877.73 While the application of the presumption has
come under increasing attack and while exceptions to the pre-
sumption's application have been recognized in jurisdictions other
than Virginia,7 4 the presumption is still applicable in most Ameri-
can jurisdictions in the absence of an applicable exception. There-
65. Id. at 588-89, 164 S.E. at 397.
66. Id. at 594, 164 S.E. at 399.
67. Id. at 591-92, 164 S.E. at 398-99.
68. Id. at 592, 164 S.E. at 398-99.
69. Id. at 594, 164 S.E. at 399.
70. Id. at 594-95, 164 S.E. at 400.
71. 160 Va. 587, 169 S.E. 907 (1933).
72. Id. at 591, 169 S.E. at 908.
73. The presumption that employment for an unspecified duration is terminable at will
was identified as the American rule in 1877. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). This presumption was contrary to the English common law,
which presumed that employment was for a year unless otherwise specified. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 118, 119-20 (1976).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 85-102.
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fore, cases from other jurisdictions provide examples of what evi-
dence may be persuasive in rebutting the presumption.
As noted above, the Virginia court has looked to the written and
oral negotiations between the parties as a guide to ascertaining
their intent with respect to the duration of the employment.7 5 Sim-
ilarly, in determining whether negotiations occurred and whether
agreement was reached on the conditions under which either party
could terminate the employment relationship, other courts have
examined the employment application s and statements made dur-
ing the interviewing process.
The Supreme Court of Virginia and other courts have examined
the customs of the industry or trade as a guide to ascertaining in-
tent.7 8 However, limited weight should be given to such evidence
unless the employee concedes knowledge of those customs at the
time the employment relationship commenced or unless the indus-
try practice was discussed by the parties at some point and ac-
knowledged to be applicable. Without such knowledge by the em-
ployee or discussion and acknowledgment of applicability, evidence
of custom is not probative of the parties' mutual understanding
and intent.
The courts have also examined the parties' statements and con-
duct during the employment as evidence of the practical construc-
tion of the parties' understanding and intent in entering into or
modifying the employment contract. Thus, the employer's offer of
severance pay as an inducement to procure the employee's resigna-
tion has been deemed inconsistent with employment at will. 79 Sim-
75. Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. at 595, 164 S.E. at 398-99.
76. Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (application
acknowledged that employment could be terminated with or without cause and with or
without notice, at any time, and that only the president or vice-president had authority to
enter into a contrary employment contract); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458,
465-66, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982) (application specified ihat em-
ployment was subject to provisions of personnel handbook).
77. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, _ 292 N.W.2d 880, 890
(1980) (employees assured of job security "as long as ... [they] did ... [their] job"); Wei-
ner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197
(1982) (employee relied on assurance of policy of not terminating employees without cause).
78. Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. at 592, 164 S.E. at 398-99; accord Maloney
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (applying Delaware law,
contracts of other employers in industry examined).
79. Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. at 594, 164 S.E. at 399. But see Maloney v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d at 939 (under Delaware law, severance pay policy
expected where termination can occur without cause).
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ilarly, assurance of job security or employment for as long as per-
formance is satisfactory has negated the presumption that the
employment is at will.s°
Literature setting forth company policies or procedures relating
to termination has been considered in determining whether the
employment contract contained any limitation on the employer's
ability to terminate. The courts are divided on the effect of the
issuance of a personnel manual or policy statement on disciplinary
procedure and job security. In Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Co.,"' the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a personnel manual
published after employment began did not modify the employee's
at-will contract because the terms in the manual had not been bar-
gained for, any benefits conferred were mere gratuities, and the
manual was only a unilateral expression of company policy and
procedures.8 2
In contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield8 that statements of policy issued after
the employee's employment created contractual rights. The court
found that contract rights were created upon the statement's issu-
ance even though the employer and employee had never agreed
that the statements were contractual; the statements were not
signed by the employer and employee; the policy could be unilater-
ally amended without notice; and the statements contained no ref-
erence to the employee, his job, or his compensation. 4
Thus, in any litigation challenging the employer's ability to dis-
miss the employee with or without cause, at any time, counsel for
the employee must review all the dealings between parties, from
80. Maloney v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d at 938 (Delaware law; employ-
ment to continue as long as performance satisfactory and economic conditions permit).
81. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
82. Id. at -, 551 P.2d at 782. Accord Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299.
N.W.2d 147 (1980).
83. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
84. Id. at -, 292 N.W.2d at 892. Accord Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622, 626-30 (Minn. 1983) (handbook, if given to employee, modifies existing con-
tract while employee continues in employ); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458,
466-67, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982) (limitations on employer's right
to terminate might be inferred from personnel policies and procedures handbook).
In Maloney v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d at 939, the District of Columbia
court was asked to apply Delaware law to the presumption of at-will employment. Among
the factors found to rebut the presumption was the distribution of an employee benefit
summary which addressed potential causes for discharge but which did not include the arbi-
trary whim of the employer.
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the inception of negotiations prior to employment through the date
of discharge, in order to develop all facts possible to rebut the pre-
sumption of at-will employment. On the other hand, even when no
litigation is threatened, the employer and his counsel should con-
stantly review the operation of the employer's business to ensure
that no facts exist which may limit the employer's ability to termi-
nate employees if that is the type of flexibility the employer
desires.8 5
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE ABILITY To TERMINATE
Aside from limitations imposed by the facts in a given case, sev-
eral legal theories have emerged to avoid raising at-will presump-
tion altogether. Virginia, which recognizes and applies this pre-
sumption, has not yet addressed these theories, although at least
one federal district court has held that they are not recognized in
Virginia.8 Other jurisdictions, however, have been receptive to
these arguments.
A. Implied Contractual Terms
Some courts recognize an implied covenant of good faith in all
employment contracts, including those of unspecified duration.8 7
The courts which have found such a covenant have relied upon
such facts as the payment of commissions as part of the employee's
compensation,"8 the length of the employee's association with the
employer,89 and the employee's adoption of grievance and discipli-
85. See infra text accompanying notes 105-10.
86. In Fisher v. Southern Oxygen & Supply Co., Civil Action No. 82-0912-R (E.D. Va.
Sept. 26, 1983), the court held that Virginia has not yet recognized an implied good-faith
obligation in at-will employment contracts. Id. at 2. The court further expressed its belief
that the Supreme Court of Virginia would not recognize such an implied obligation because
it had previously characterized such contracts as contracts of hazard. Id. Finally, the court
stated that the recognition of a cause of action in tort for abusive discharge or for bad-faith
discharge was incompatible with the presumption that an employment contract of unspeci-
fied duration is terminable at will by either party. Id. at 3.
87. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Gram v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., - Mass. -, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974).
88. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. at -, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
89. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d at 328, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927; Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. at -, 364 N.E.2d at 1258.
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nary procedures" ° as bases for implying such an obligation.
Most of the courts that infer such a covenant have held that the
covenant is not breached simply because the employer lacked good
cause to terminate.91 Rather, the absence of good cause is a factor
to be considered, along with such other factors as whether the em-
ployer made a bona fide investigation to support the termination
and whether the employer received some benefit as a result of the
dismissal.92 The presence of good cause, however, negates a charge
of bad faith. 3 Some courts have refused to find a breach of the
implied covenant solely because the employer used a false reason
or a pretext to justify the discharge to the employee. 9
On the other hand, many courts have refused to find an implied
covenant of good faith in an at-will employment contract,95 basi-
cally for two reasons. First, these courts perceive an implied obliga-
tion of good faith as inconsistent with other terms of the contrac-
tual relationship. If the employment is at will, the employer enjoys
an unfettered right to discharge the employee at any time, and "it
would be incongruous to say that an inference may be drawn that
the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be de-
structive of his right of termination."96 Second, these courts have
been concerned with unnecessarily limiting the employer's discre-
tion in managing the work force.97
Rather than imply a covenant of good faith in an at-will con-
tract, those courts which do imply such a convenant should ex-
amine both the basis for the at-will presumption and the advisabil-
ity of using such a good-faith covenant. The implication of the
90. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927; Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
91. E.g., Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., - Mass. at _ , 429 N.E.2d at 27.
92. Id. at _ 429 N.E.2d at 27.
93. Id. at , 429 N.E.2d at 27.
94. Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 358 Mass. 300, _ 431 N.E.2d 908, 911 (1982) (at-will
employer has no duty to offer the employee a reason; concealment of real reason therefore
not actionable).
95. Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, _ 620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980); Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., - Hawaii , _ 652 P.2d 625, 629
(1982); Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 IM. App. 3d 664, _ , 384 N.E.2d 91, 95
(1978); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, _ 448 N.E.2d 86, 91,
461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983); Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, _, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, _ , 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (1983).
96. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d at , 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 237.
97. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d at _ 335 N.W.2d at 838.
19831
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
covenant results in uncertainty because the court must then strug-
gle to define the scope of the covenant. The parties are capable of
addressing the issue of termination directly in their contract and
are free to provide for whatever procedural steps they desire before
termination. If the parties choose not to address the duration of
the contract expressly, the courts should handle the relationship
according to rules that are easy to apply.
The beauty of the at-will presumption is that it is easy and
straightforward. The employee always has the opportunity to rebut
the presumption by facts and circumstances demonstrating a dif-
ferent employment relationship. If the courts believe the employee
deserves or is entitled to more protection than the at-will pre-
sumption provides, the courts should adopt a rebuttable presump-
tion providing that protection. To hold that the relationship is pre-
sumed to be at will while simultaneously implying a covenant of
good faith is inconsistent and negates the certainty which the law
should strive to provide. Such inconsistency also fails to protect
the employee because he is least able to afford a lengthy court fight
to establish his rights.
B. Limitations Based on Public Policy
Some courts recognize a cause of action where the dismissal vio-
lates some public policy98 and allow the terminated employee to
recover damages if the policy violated is well-established and im-
portant.9 The scope of the cause of action differs depending on the
source of the public policy. For example, some courts will permit
such a cause of action only when the public policy is evidenced by
an existing law.100 Other courts recognize judicially conceived and
defined policies, such as that of encouraging employees to inform
law enforcement authorities of the illegal activities of fellow
employees. 10 1
98. E.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 287 N.E.2d 902 (1973); Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
99. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d at -, 335 N.W.2d at 838.
100. Id. at -, 335 N.W.2d at 840. In Brockmeyer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that "existing law" consisted of constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. at - 335
N.W.2d at 840.
101. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IMI. 2d 124, _ 421 N.E.2d 876, 880
(1981).
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On the other hand, some courts have refused to permit at-will
employees to sue and recover for a discharge which violates public
policy. 10 2 These courts have rejected the cause of action because of
its inconsistency with the at-will presumption and because of a
conviction that such a significant change in the law is best left to
the legislature so that a "principled statutory scheme [can be]...
adopted after opportunity for public ventilation. '" 10 3
As noted above, the state courts have not addressed the issue of
whether a cause of action for termination in violation of public pol-
icy exists in Virginia. However, the Virginia General Assembly has
declared the termination of an employee to be unlawful under cer-
tain circumstances, regardless of whether an at-will relationship
exists. For example, section 34-29(f) of the Virginia Code declares
that "[n]o employer may discharge any employee by reason of the
fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any
one indebtedness."11 04 Section 40.1-51.2:1 provides that "[n]o per-
son shall discharge . ..an employee because the employee has
filed a safety or health complaint or has testified or otherwise ac-
ted to exercise rights under the safety and health provisions of this
title for themselves or others. 1 0 5 Section 40.1-51.2:2 permits an
employee who has exhausted certain administrative remedies to
sue an employer for a discharge in violation of the safety and
health laws.106 Thus, the Virginia legislature has permitted at-will
employees to sue their employers where the reason for their dis-
missal violates a specific statute.
V. PRESERVING THE AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP
Under current Virginia law, if the employer wishes to be free to
terminate his employees at any time for any reason or even for no
reason, he can take certain measures to minimize the risk of a suc-
cessful challenge to discharge. Of course, there is no way that he
can eliminate all possibility of litigation arising out of an employee
termination because the dismissed employee can institute suit and
102. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); DeMarco v. Publix
Super Mkts. Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46
Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
103. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d at , 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 236.
104. VA. CoDE ANN. § 34-29(f) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
105. Id. § 40.1-51.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
106. Id. § 40.1-51.2:2.
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put the employer to expense simply by paying the filing and pro-
cess fees at the courthouse. However, by adopting certain person-
nel procedures and by controlling communications with his em-
ployees, the employer can minimize the possibility that a
discharged at-will employee will sue and can enhance the likeli-
hood that the employer will prevail if litigation does occur.
A. The Employment Application
The first contact between a prospective employer and employee
is usually the job application, which is designed to provide the em-
ployer with information on the prospective employee's background
and experience. The application therefore presents the first oppor-
tunity for the employer to make explicit his policies on the dura-
tion of employment and his ability to end the relationship. The
employer should consider including language similar to the follow-
ing in bold print immediately above the line for the applicant's
signature:
IF I AM EMPLOYED, IN CONSIDERATION OF MY EMPLOY-
MENT, I AGREE TO CONFORM TO THE POLICIES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS OF [EMPLOYER] AND I UNDERSTAND
AND AGREE THAT MY EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSA-
TION CAN BE TERMINATED, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE,
AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE, AT ANY TIME, AT THE
OPTION OF EITHER [EMPLOYER] OR MYSELF. I UNDER-
STAND AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NO REPRESENTATIVE
OF [EMPLOYER], OTHER THAN THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-
PRESIDENT OF [EMPLOYER], HAS ANY AUTHORITY TO
ENTER INTO ANY WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENT FOR
EMPLOYMENT FOR ANY SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME, OR
TO MAKE ANY AGREEMENT CONTRARY TO THE
FOREGOING.10 7
B. The Hiring Interview
The employer should ensure that recruiters and personnel inter-
viewers receive careful instructions concerning what they can and
cannot say about the duration of the employment and the condi-
107. A substantially similar clause was approved and used to establish the at-will nature
of the employment in Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich.
1980).
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tions for dismissal. Recruiters should be informed of the limita-
tions on their authority to bind the employer or to make a contract
with the prospective employee, and the recruiter should in turn
inform the applicant of these limitations at the beginning of the
interview. Those who recruit and interview should be told to avoid
sweeping statements about length of employment, assurances of
continued employment, or prospective career opportunities with
the employer. If appropriate, the recruiter should emphasize to ap-
plicants that either the employer or employee can terminate the
employment with or without cause, with or without notice, at any
time.
C. The Employment Contract
Obviously, the most certain way to establish the at-will nature of
the employment is by a written contract with each employee. The
contract should directly address the at-will nature of the employ-
ment by a clause such as the following:
[Employer] agrees to employ [Employee] commencing on [date].
[Employee's] employment with [Employer] can be terminated, with
or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the
option of [Employee] or [Employer].
The employer may wish to modify the clause to provide a notice
period prior to the effective date of termination.
If such a written contract is used, it should contain a merger
clause providing that "[t]his contract embodies the entire under-
standing between the parties and cancels and supersedes all prior
agreements and understandings; and no change, alteration, or
modification may be made except in writing signed by both par-
ties." 108 The contract should address the employee's compensation
in terms of a rate rather than a specified amount for a specified
time period.10 9 Finally, the contract should contain a clause obli-
gating the employee to conform to the rules, regulations, and poli-
cies of the employer, to perform the duties of his employment to
108. A similar merger clause was upheld and enforced to preclude evidence of additional
terms to the employment relationship in Meinrath v. Singer Co., 482 F. Supp. 457, 460
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
109. Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 716, 164 S.E. 387, 390 (1932) (contract specify-
ing compensation "at the rate of $708.34 per month" is different from one specifying com-
pensation as "$708.34 per month"); see also supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
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the highest standards of competence, skill, and efficiency, and to
perform the duties of his employment exclusively in furtherance of
his employer's best interests.
D. Personnel Manuals and Policies
If the employer has a personnel manual or written disciplinary
and termination procedures, the manual or procedures should ex-
pressly disclaim any intent to create a binding contract with the
employee. A clause like the following should appear at the begin-
ning of the manual:
This manual has been prepared for the guidance of supervisory
employees of [Employer]. It is not intended to form and is not a
contract or a part of any contract between [Employer] and its em-
ployees. The manual describes [Employer's] general philosophy con-
cerning personnel procedures and may be modified or altered unilat-
erally by [Employer] at any time."0
The employer may wish to place a similar disclaimer at the be-
ginning of any section addressing disciplinary and/or termination
procedures. If possible, personnel manuals outlining disciplinary or
termination procedures should be distributed only to supervisory
personnel. Statements of personnel policy or practices distributed
to all employees should reserve broad discretion for the employer
to modify the policies without giving notice to the employees. As a
further safeguard, the termination procedure should not be des-
cribed in any greater detail than necessary.
E. Termination
Before discharging an employee, the employer should carefully
document all the facts leading to termination. If the employer has
received the information from others, he should seek sworn written
statements from the original sources of the information.
The employer may also wish to review the termination decision
with his attorney. Counsel should be informed of all the facts un-
derlying the decision to terminate. If the employee is allegedly be-
ing discharged for violation of a rule, regulation, or policy, the em-
110. See Baxter, Managing the Risks in Firing Employees, 6 NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1983,
at 20.
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ployer's attorney should satisfy himself that the rule, regulation, or
policy actually exists and is uniformly applied. He should also de-
termine whether any statutory problems, such as charges of dis-
crimination based on age, sex, or race, may be presented by the
proposed termination. Counsel should review the history of the
employee's relationship with the employer, including any written
employment contract, representations concerning job security or
causes for dismissal, and any other factors which suggest a rela-
tionship other than at-will employment. After reviewing this infor-
mation, counsel can assist the employer in evaluating the advisa-
bility of terminating the employee and the possible exposure to a
lawsuit because of this action.
Once he has decided on dismissal, the employer should meet
with the employee to inform him of the decision. The meeting
should be brief and direct, with only the employee and the em-
ployer or his representative present. The employer should not be
apologetic. If he decides to offer the employee a reason for the
firing, he should be candid. Of course, where the employee can be
discharged only for cause, the employer must articulate the reason
for termination.
If the employer anticipates litigation, he should consider the
possibility of entering into a separation agreement with the dis-
missed employee to settle all differences which may arise from ei-
ther the employment or the termination. Such an agreement must
be supported by consideration, such as a severance payment, pro-
vided that such a payment is not already required by the employ-
ment contract. The employer should make every effort to demon-
strate that the employee knowingly and voluntarily executed the
agreement; that is, that the employee understood the consequences
of signing the document and the fact that he was under no obliga-
tion to sign. Such agreements have been enforced by the courts.111
VI. CONCLUSION
With an awareness of the law on dismissal of employees, careful
structuring of all aspects of the employment relationship from the
first interview through termination, and careful consideration
before discharge of the facts and probable consequences, an em-
ployer and his attorney can manage the probability and minimize
111. E.g., Bachorik v. Allied Control Co., 34 A.D.2d 940, -, 312 N.Y.S.2d 272, 275
(1970).
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the risks of suit by a dismissed employee. A few hours spent in
properly structuring the employer's recruitment, disciplinary, and
termination procedures and documents may save countless hours
and resources in defending employee lawsuits later.
